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BANKRUPTCY STIGMA AND VULNERABILITY: 
QUESTIONING AUTONOMY AND STRUCTURING 
RESILIENCE 
ABSTRACT 
Stigma is an enduring byproduct of bankruptcy, both as felt by the debtor 
and as perceived by society. The stigma exists even though some have declared 
its demise, and is certainly present after the BAPCPA amendments aimed at 
action intended to revive the stigmatic effect of filing for bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy stigma may be a useful tool when it prompts individuals to make 
wiser fiscal decisions, but for debtors who face uncontrollable financial 
circumstances, this same stigma is burdensome and does not provide a social 
benefit. Even worse, ineffective stigma exacerbates debtor vulnerability when 
bankruptcy could provide tools for debtor resilience and “fresh start.” 
This Comment examines how stigma operates in bankruptcy, the emphasis 
on stigma in bankruptcy law changes, and stigma’s relation to vulnerability 
analysis. The conclusion proposes revisions to the Bankruptcy Code that take 
into account debtor vulnerability and provide debtor resilience. In support of 
this conclusion, this Comment examines the pervasiveness of stigma and 
autonomy in the bankruptcy context and how these were especially seen in the 
discussion preceding BAPCPA. The means test and prepetition credit 
counseling requirements reinforce the Bankruptcy Code’s structured 
autonomy, which is required for effective application of behavioral stigma. 
Vulnerability theory provides an important counterpoint to the Code’s 
imposition of stigma on debtors by critiquing radical autonomy and arguing 
for responsive, rather than stigmatizing, structures. Applying vulnerability 
theory, three levels of remedies emerge that address the problem of ineffective, 
autonomy-based stigma: Code changes that remove stigmatizing provisions, 
structural Code changes that separately treat uncontrollable debt, and extra-
bankruptcy structures that support individual resilience and decrease the need 
for bankruptcy filing altogether. 
  
MOLS GALLEYSPROOFS1 12/19/2012 11:37 AM 
290 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
INTRODUCTION 
“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own 
way.”1 Although Tolstoy’s famous quote dealt primarily with the infelicities of 
intra-family relationships, it provides surprising insight into the plight of 
debtors seeking bankruptcy relief. Happy, financially secure families are alike 
in one vital sense: they are apparently independent. This supposed autonomy 
forms a buffer from the gradations of financial dependency that may lead to the 
stigma of bankruptcy. But, the path from resource rich resiliency is broad and 
contains many branches. Each unhappy family comes to bankruptcy with its 
own unique story to tell: job loss, debilitating illness, lack of adequate 
insurance, divorce, or death.2 Dependency may be direct, as a major illness that 
requires time off from work;3 or indirect, as the caregiver for a terminally ill 
family member.4 Though these families are unhappy in their own way, as they 
approach bankruptcy, they are made alike through stigma.5 
Stigma affects debtors before filing by weighing on their moral conscience 
that they should repay their debts. It also operates through societal disapproval 
and shaming after filing, especially if society perceives they were responsible 
for the decisions that led to this situation.6 This notion of fault is based on a 
 
 1 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Constance Garnett trans. 1901). 
 2 Recent studies show that a majority of individual bankruptcy filers are in financial peril because of 
medical-related costs. High costs for medical care and prescriptions, insufficient insurance, and loss of 
caregiver income, among other costs, make medical bankruptcies increasingly common in the United States. 
See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 
122 AM. J. MED., Aug. 2009, at 741; see also David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in 
Massachusetts: Has Health Reform Made a Difference?, 124 AM. J. MED., Mar. 2011 at 224. 
 3 This is known as “inevitable dependency,” because it recognizes that illness, as well as aging, is an 
“unavoidable and inescapable dependency.” MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 35 (2004). 
 4 Derivative dependency is distinct from inevitable dependency and “arises when a person 
assumes . . . responsibility for the care of an inevitably dependent person.” Id. at 35–36. Fineman further notes, 
“[T]hose who care for others are themselves dependent on resources in order to undertake that care.” Id. at 36. 
 5 Often supported and directed by the law, stigma operates on a more foundational level of social 
punishment and shaming. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, REPUTATION 68, 73 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (“Shame 
justice is justice by the mob: the dominant group are asked to take delight in the discomfort of the excluded 
and stigmatized.”). 
 6 Stigma can be used for a host of socially constructed deviancies, with some based on identity and some 
based on fault. In the bankruptcy context, it makes most sense to think about stigma based on behavior and 
fault. See infra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
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presumption of fundamental autonomy7 and individual agency that not only 
runs through the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”),8 but also through the 
American legal system as a whole.9 The once clear notion of individual 
autonomy and fault in bankruptcy has become murky in recent years, 
especially in the continuing wake of the subprime mortgage crisis that surfaced 
after the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”), which amended the Code. While stigma may be applied and 
perceived in all bankruptcies, it has little effect on decision-making at the 
moment immediately before filing. Stigma can only work to change behavior if 
an alternative course of action is possible, and therefore its effectiveness for 
prospectively molding action depends on when it is imposed. Imposing stigma 
when there is only one viable action—for instance, upon someone’s last-resort 
bankruptcy—serves only to punish, not to shape behavior. On the other hand, 
stigma may function to shape behavior in line with social norms when it is 
imposed at a point when alternate decisions are available. Structures that 
recognize vulnerability and support individual resilience can address the issues 
at the heart of an individual’s financial difficulties. These supports would 
proactively take into consideration, and attempt to alleviate, circumstances that 
lead to the stigmatizing of debtors, instead of reactively imposing stigma only 
at the point of bankruptcy. 
This Comment will analyze the interrelated concepts of stigma, autonomy, 
and vulnerability in the context of bankruptcy. The Comment concludes that 
debtors will come closer to receiving a fresh start through social structures that 
create resiliency. Part I explores how stigma has and continues to operate in 
society. This Part explores the interrelatedness of behavioral stigma, 
autonomy, and legislative action in United States bankruptcy history. Part II 
discusses the structure of the Code, and how provisions like the voluntary 
filing provision, prepetition credit counseling, and the means test perpetuate 
and reinforce behavioral stigma. Part III expounds the vulnerability paradigm: 
 
 7 Fundamental, or radical, autonomy refers to the sense of individual self-sufficiency, in contrast to a 
notion of mutual interdependency, an alternative way of thinking about autonomy. See FINEMAN, THE 
AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3, at 20, 28–29. 
 8 The ability to voluntarily file is the most obvious example in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 9 See generally FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3, at 20–21 (explaining that the American 
legal system is based upon and idealizes the economically self-sufficient individual and family, in its 
independence from state and government support). “Autonomy is the term we use when describing the 
relationship between the individual and the state . . . . [W]e think of an economically self-sufficient individual 
as autonomous in relation to society and its institutions.”) Id. 
MOLS GALLEYSPROOFS1 12/19/2012 11:37 AM 
292 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
an alternative framework that questions autonomy and agency, and instead 
posits the enduring vulnerability of all legal subjects.10 Part IV uses this 
vulnerability paradigm to propose remedies to bankruptcy provisions designed 
to stigmatize debtors, focusing on the previously discussed means test and 
prepetition credit counseling requirement. It also considers other structures, 
within and beyond bankruptcy, which would provide resilience in areas known 
to be the source of uncontrollable debt for vulnerable subjects. 
I. STIGMA DEFINED AND ITS RELATION TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Stigma operates in bankruptcy as a product of competing social and 
economic norms and finite resources. Social norms dictate that individuals 
keep promises and pay back debts; yet, society emphasizes consumption11 and 
makes credit readily available for those borrowing beyond their means.12 The 
tension between these norms fluctuates with the health of the economy and 
with shifts in how society perceives debtor stigma. Because stigma grows and 
shifts over time, both in bankruptcy and in other areas, Part I examines 
stigma’s general mechanics. After defining stigma, this Part explores two 
reasons for shifting stigma: societal revaluation of norms and reconsideration 
of individual control over behaviors and circumstances. It then provides a brief 
history of U.S. bankruptcy law focusing on stigma’s role in that history. 
A. Stigma Defined 
The ancient Greeks defined stigma as a “system of markings typically 
burned . . . onto the bodies of criminals, traitors, and prostitutes as a way of 
 
 10 See, e.g., LORNA FOX O’MAHONEY, HOME EQUITY AND AGEING OWNERS: BETWEEN RISK AND 
REGULATION 187 (2012); Martha Alberston Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 
EMORY L.J. 251 (2010); Martha Alberston Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008); Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability 
and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 277 (2010).  
 11 In a press conference on December 20, 2006, then President George W. Bush told Americans that the 
year 2007 would “require difficult choices and additional sacrifices,” and to keep the economy growing, he 
encouraged Americans to “go shopping more.” Amanda Terkel, With Recession Looming Bush Tells America 
to ‘Go Shopping More,’ THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 20, 2006, 12:56 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2006/ 
12/20/9281/bush-shopping/; see also Amy Novotney, What’s Behind American Consumerism?, 39 MONITOR 
ON PSYCHOLOGY, July 2008 at 40, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/07-08/consumerism.aspx. 
 12 David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or 
Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 332–33 (1999) (remarking about the lending practices of the 1980s: 
“[I]nterest-rate deregulation and falling inflation made it increasingly profitable for consumer lenders to reach 
deeper into the income distribution for borrowers”). 
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identifying them as people ‘to be discredited, scorned, and avoided.’”13 Even 
though physical markings are largely gone, social stigma still remains in legal 
punishment, primarily upon criminals.14 Stigma allows society to express its 
moral disapproval; those who engage in sexual behaviors that deviate from 
social norms especially feel these sanctions.15 Stigma devalues individuals that 
make up a particular group based on their failure to conform to societal 
norms.16 
Stigma requires both a social norm and a deviation from the norm. Stigma 
can be based on identities (like race, ethnicity, or gender) or on behaviors (like 
spending habits or sexual orientation).17 This Comment focuses on behavioral 
stigmas. Behavioral stigmas, including bankruptcy, are based largely on 
society’s presumption that the stigmatized individual has control of the 
stigmatized behavior.18 When an individual is in control of the stigma-
inducing, norm-deviant behavior, greater social stigma will apply than when 
 
 13 R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
803, 814 (2004) (citing Steven L. Neuberg et al., Why People Stigmatize: Toward a Biocultural Framework, in 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA 31, 31 (Todd F. Heatherton et al. eds., 2000)). 
 14 See Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of 
Consistent Beliefs, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2007) (“It is widely accepted that a criminal conviction 
generates more stigma for the convicted party than an administrative penalty. . . . [H]igher stigma associated 
with criminal convictions is justified on the grounds that a criminal conviction conveys more reliable 
information about guilt than an administrative one.” (footnote omitted)); see also W. David Ball, The Civil 
Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In Re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 117, 155 (2011) (noting that Justice Stevens’ dissent in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), stated 
that a sex offender registry “law was criminal because it restricted liberty and imposed ‘severe stigma’”). 
 15 See Joy Baskin, School Law, 74 TEX. B.J. 40, 40 (2011) (noting that the stigma attached to sex 
offender registries has prompted the Texas Legislature “to consider creating a lesser offense that would 
criminalize and punish sexting.”); Amalia Lucia Cabezas, Legal Challenges to and by Sex Workers/Prostitutes, 
48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79, 88 (2000) (quoting Jo Bindman, Redefining Prostitution as Sex Work on the 
International Agenda, 1997 ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L 111) (“[S]tigma and criminal charges [are] widely attached 
to sex work.”)); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 384 (1996) (“[B]ecause of the prejudice, stigma, 
and suspicion that attaches to the victim of a sex crime, the jury may be unwilling to accept the testimony of 
the victim for the ironic reason that she is in fact, or at least purports to be, a victim of a sex crime.”). 
 16 Stigma is defined as “the social devaluation of a person who is deviant from or contrary to a social 
unit’s norm.” Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 481, 483 (2006). 
 17 See, e.g., Jo C. Phelan et al., Stigma and Prejudice: One Animal or Two?, 67 SOCIAL SCIENCE & 
MEDICINE 358, 362 fig. 1 (2008) (representing the behavioral and motivational factors involved in the 
functions of stigma and prejudice); Lenhardt, supra note 13 (addressing racial stigma). 
 18 Wendy P. Heath et al., Yes, I Did It, But Don’t Blame Me: Perceptions of Excuse Defenses, 31 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L., 187, 189 (2003) (“If a behavior or event is perceived as controllable, the actor is perceived 
as responsible; uncontrollable actions do not elicit perceptions of responsibility.”). 
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there is a perceived lack of control over the behavior.19 For instance, society 
has a norm against talking in a movie theater: social stigma attaches more 
strongly to the adult who freely chooses to have a cell phone conversation 
during the movie than a crying child or an adult overcome with a fit of 
coughing, due to an actual or perceived lack of control. Behavioral stigma can 
shift in two ways: changing social norms or information that the stigmatized 
individual has a lack of control over her actions.20 Thus, the norm against 
theater-talking may subside altogether if cell phone conversations during 
movies become commonplace, and the norm may cease to apply to an 
individual if more information indicates that her outbursts are involuntary. 
Either of these shifts changes the way stigma attaches to a particular individual 
in a particular situation. For socially-deviant behavior, controllable and 
uncontrollable stigma can operate concurrently, leading to the complicated 
perception of the individual as both deviant (in that the behavior was 
controllable) and disadvantaged (in that the status that led to the behavior was 
uncontrollable). These conflicting perceptions provoke simultaneous societal 
responses of antipathy and compassion.21 
Because social norms and public perception of what constitutes a willful 
violation of the norm shift over time, behavioral stigmas are very difficult to 
gauge.22 Social pressures and stigmas against filing for bankruptcy remain, 
even as penal sanctions have subsided, because bankruptcy is increasingly 
public and reputationally harmful.23 In contemporary American society, 
bankruptcy stigma still makes debtors reluctant to file voluntary petitions, even 
under extreme circumstances.24 The stigma of bankruptcy occurs regardless of 
 
 19 IRWIN KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4 (1981) (“[C]haracterological stigmas, 
entailing known or alleged violations of moral norms, would no doubt tend to be viewed (at least on a 
conscious level) as more voluntary than the tribal and bodily stigmas.”). 
 20 Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 16, at 483–85. 
 21 KATZ, supra note 19, at 5.  
 22 See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 365 (2006). 
 23 Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 242–44 (2006) (noting that nearly 85% 
of families filing for bankruptcy in 2001 said they would be embarrassed if others knew of their bankruptcy 
filing, but bankruptcy filings are publicly available on the Internet); see also Volkmar Gessner et al., Three 
Functions of Bankruptcy Law: The West German Case, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV., 499, 531–32 (1978) (noting 
that voluntary bankruptcy was introduced in medieval Italy to allow debtors to avoid the penal sanctions of 
involuntary bankruptcy, though moral stigma and social sanctions remained despite the changes).  
 24 Sullivan et al., supra note 23, at 242 (“[F]amilies may be more reluctant to file for bankruptcy than 
ever before.”). 
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whether the debtor’s financial situation is within her control25 or not,26 and 
regardless of whether the petition is filed voluntarily27 or involuntarily.28 
Similarly, when lawmakers and policymakers intend to shift the level of stigma 
in bankruptcy, they do not focus only on those behaviors perceived as within 
the individual actor’s control.29 However, laws cannot affect decisions of 
individuals who are unable to freely make them, and an individual’s choices 
are motivated by factors other than laws. 
Stigma’s pervasiveness in bankruptcy has negative psychological effects on 
the debtor. The debtor knows that people could find out about her bankruptcy 
filing, and most people are concerned about their reputation in their 
community.30 Lawyers have used the psychologically stigmatizing effect of 
bankruptcy in legal arguments outside the bankruptcy context, drawing 
attention to community perceptions.31 Aware of the possible prejudice against 
 
 25 See e.g., In re Crink, 402 B.R. 159 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that allowing debtors to continue 
in chapter 7 would be an abuse because debtors passed the means test only because of their excessive budget 
due to unreasonable housing expenses). While Crink does not mention stigma, the presumption of abuse based 
on high, unnecessary expenditures in the face of job loss and current ability to pay is behavior deemed highly 
deserving of stigma in the Code, and a reason for creating the presumption of abuse in the means test. 
 26 In Fantozzi v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Villa Park, the debtor was suspended from his 
job as a police officer because of his bankruptcy filing, even though most of his non-real estate debt he accrued 
was for his wife’s numerous medical operations over the course of five and a half years. 27 Ill. 2d 357, 359 
(1963). 
 27 See, e.g., id. at 359 (local police board viewed voluntary bankruptcy as indicative of the individual’s 
instability and reputational harm to the department); In re Gold Standard Baking, Inc., 179 B.R. 98, 103 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Any negative impact on the Debtor’s business and perceived stigma attached thereto, 
was self-created when the Debtor voluntarily filed this Chapter 11 case.”) 
 28 In re Hope Commc’ns, Inc., 59 B.R. 939, 943 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (remarking the policy behind 
excluding disputed claims in involuntary bankruptcy’s “to preclude creditors from dragging debtors into the 
stigma of an involuntary bankruptcy, when in fact the claim is subject to a valid, legitimate dispute”). 
 29 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 at 598 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 218. The minority 
view expressed by Representative Robert C. Scott of Virginia, before the passage of BAPCPA. He critiqued 
the bill for not differentiating between those who abused the system and those who did not, noting that the law 
affects behavior only of those who have control over their circumstances: “People who feel they have nothing 
left to lose often lack any incentive to be a productive member of society, and this can also create a potential 
danger to society. . . . [T]his legislation does not differentiate between those who abuse the system and those 
who truly need the aid it provides.” Id. 
 30 Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 371, 377 (2001) 
(noting status loss is a common psychological effect of stigma; other elements of stigma include: labeling, 
stereotyping, separation and discrimination, and all five are secured by the operation of power). 
 31 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Prior 
Bankruptcy Filing By Mr. Walser and Mrs. Walser at 5, Willow Wind Organic Farms, Inc. v. Kenyon Zero 
Storage, Inc., No. CV-04-155-FVS (E.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2006) (moving to exclude character evidence that 
would be unduly prejudicial to the client witness in a contract dispute). 
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his clients, one lawyer moved to exclude from evidence his clients’ previous 
bankruptcy filing and asserted: 
[T]he filing of a bankruptcy has a common stigma that the person 
filing did not intend to pay their debts, was trying to get something 
past their creditors, or otherwise was not taking responsibility for 
their actions. . . . [S]tigma of the former bankruptcy filing has no 
bearing on [client’s] character for truthfulness and the societal stigma 
attached to bankruptcy would cause undue prejudice.32 
Because of this damning effect, this lawyer attempted to decouple stigma from 
bankruptcy, stating that bankruptcy is irrelevant character evidence.33 
However, the presence of this discussion about bankruptcy stigma (in this 
otherwise unrelated case) demonstrates the lawyer’s recognition that stigma 
causes fact finders tend to see bankruptcy as indicative of a character of 
untruthfulness. 
Stigma’s ability to harm reputations may lead creditors to use involuntary 
bankruptcy against small town debtors whose reputation they wish to tarnish. 
In one bankruptcy case, a local radio station was a debtor to several of its 
former employee salespeople, who earned unpaid commissions.34 These 
unpaid commissions made them the radio station’s creditors. Several of these 
former employees were working at a competitor radio station and had a 
financial interest in putting their debtor former employer out of business.35 The 
court noted that bankruptcy stigma was likely an impetus for these creditors 
pushing for involuntary bankruptcy and that policy dictates against allowing 
creditors seeking a debtor’s reputational harm to file involuntary 
bankruptcies.36 
Bankruptcy stigma can be used as a weapon against debtors or as a factor to 
evoke sympathy, depending on the debtor’s perceived culpability. One court, 
on appeal, examined whether an involuntary case should be dismissed in the 
best interests of the creditors and debtor.37 The reviewing court noted that the 
bankruptcy court’s finding of generalized stigma was not sufficiently specific 
 
 32 Id.  
 33 Id.  
 34 In re Hope Commc’ns, Inc., 59 B.R. 939, 940–41 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (disputing the debt of these 
commissions). 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 941, 943. 
 37 ProFutures Special Equities Fund, L.P. v. Spade (In re Spade), 255 B.R. 329 (D. Colo. 2000). 
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to determine that dismissal was in the best interest of the parties.38 On the 
contrary, the appellate court held that the debtor’s culpability for his 
company’s financial distress justified the general stigma attendant to 
bankruptcy.39 Likewise, another court reinforced that actions, not stigma, were 
of higher importance when considering whether to dismiss the case.40 That 
court noted that the effects of stigma on the debtor were unclear, but any 
stigma that would attach would be deserved because of the debtor’s actions.41 
Arguments drawing attention to the stigma of bankruptcy therefore can 
influence judges, though judges will also consider the culpability of the 
debtor’s behavior. There is some stigma attendant to bankruptcy, but it seems 
deserved when the bankruptcy is a result of freely chosen action. 
B. Stigma in the Code 
Lawmakers have modified U.S. bankruptcy law according to shifting 
perceptions of debtor irresponsibility and the appropriateness of imposing 
stigma.42 This Subpart describes how Congress has changed the Code in 
response to stigma, and also how Congress has attempted to force changes in 
social perceptions of stigma. Lawmakers both reactively respond to evolving 
views and also attempt to guide their evolution through proactive legislative 
changes.43 
In colonial America, before the first federal bankruptcy law, stigma 
operated on debtors locally.44 Informal, or privately imposed, stigma included 
physical markings on debtors like a tattoo of “T” for thief, cutting off debtors’ 
ears,45 and cutting debtors’ hair.46 Stigma was also imposed through 
 
 38 Id. at 332. 
 39 Id. (“The ‘stigma’ in this case . . . is paled by the fact that Spade had brought his company to the point 
of insolvency.”) 
 40 In re Gold Standard Baking, Inc., 179 B.R. 98, 103 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that any adverse 
impact was not supported by particular facts, and the debtor deserved any stigma upon his business because of 
the voluntary chapter 11 filing). 
 41 Id.  
 42 See Volkmar Gessner et al., supra note 23, at 530 (examining the preventative function of bankruptcy 
by focusing on “to what extent the norms, roles, and procedures of bankruptcy provide guidance (norm 
orientation) for the activities of the people concerned and give normative direction to economic behavior so as 
to facilitate trouble free interaction, especially through the avoidance of insolvencies”). 
 43 Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 375–78. 
 44 Id. at 374–75. 
 45 Id. at 375 (citing Joseph S. Pomykala, Bankruptcy Laws: The Need for Reform, in LEGAL ENV’T OF 
BUS. 178, 180 (Kurt Stanberry ed., 2000)). 
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imprisonment and flogging.47 The Constitution provides for the development 
of federal bankruptcy law.48 In the 1800s, Congress had several short-lived 
attempts at establishing a bankruptcy law.49 These early attempts responded to 
public sentiment regarding the need for bankruptcy relief that took into account 
popular attitudes about debtors; the 1874 Act was repealed in 1878 because it 
was too harsh on debtors for public sentiment.50 
The first long-standing bankruptcy law, the 1898 Nelson Act,51 indicated 
legislators’ concern with bankruptcy stigma and the social perception of debtor 
culpability. In the wake of the repeated bankruptcy repeals throughout the 
1800s, populists52 swayed public sentiment toward federal bankruptcy 
provisions, which prompted Congress to respond with the 1898 Nelson Act.53 
In this act, Congress responded to the astounding number of business failures54 
and the honest but unfortunate debtor.55 Throughout the 1800s, bankruptcy 
stigma remained high,56 and the perception of the bankrupt as a criminal 
remained even as debtors’ prisons were decreasingly common.57 Concern for 
bankruptcy stigma was explicit in the rationale for the voluntary provision. 
 
 46 Joe Pomykala, Bankruptcy’s Origins in Debtor Perpetuated Crime 2 n.2 (Mar. 2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=222377. 
 47 Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 374 (“The only consistency among debt 
laws in the 18th century was that every colony, and later every state, permitted imprisonment for debt.” 
(quoting BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 79 
(2002))). 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress shall have the power “to establish . . . uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”). 
 49 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 5, 12–23 (1995) (outlining the progression and various iterations of bankruptcy law up through 
the permanent legislation in 1898). 
 50 In re Gibraltor Amusements, 291 F.2d 22, 27 (1961) (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 51 Nelson Act (Bankruptcy Act of 1898), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). 
 52 Populists especially sought fresh start for honest debtors. In re Gibraltor Amusements, 291 F.2d at 27 
(Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 28 (noting that there was a conflict between those who supported a creditors right to recover 
debts and those who wanted to protect the debtor from creditor harassment). 
 54 Approximately 200,000 businesses failed between the 1878 repeal of the Bankruptcy Act and the 1898 
Act. Id. at 27. 
 55 Id. (“Voluntary bankruptcy is the means of redemption of the unsuccessful and fallen debtor. 
Involuntary bankruptcy is a weapon in the hands of the creditor to press collections of debt harshly, to 
intimidate, and to destroy.” (quoting Representative Lewis in the congressional debates)). 
 56 See id. (stating that under the 1898 Act, “[b]ankruptcy was viewed as a stigma difficult to erase; it was 
one thing to allow a hopelessly burdened debtor to choose this disagreeable alternative as preferable to eternal 
debt, but quite another to permit blood-thirsty creditors, with only their own interests at heart to plunge an 
unwilling debtor into disgrace”). 
 57 Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 375. 
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One lawmaker clearly distinguished mistaken and culpable debtors from those 
who were honest but unfortunate: “There have been two unfortunate periods or 
conditions in the country which have tended to destroy the business interests 
and to bankrupt business men. One period perhaps was owing to misjudgment 
of the people, and the other was in no sense their fault but was their 
misfortune.”58 
The conflicting perceptions of stigma and the increased consumer spending 
in the 1920s59 prompted lawmakers to create bankruptcy law that calibrated 
stigma based on a debtor’s ability to repay creditors. Consumer credit 
expanded greatly;60 bankruptcy filings increased.61 Some observers linked the 
two.62 U.S. Solicitor General Thomas D. Thatcher blamed the increased filings 
on the declining social stigma associated with bankruptcy and suggested that 
filers were dishonest and fraudulent.63 To provide incentives for non-
fraudulent filers, Solicitor General Thatcher recommended a separate 
bankruptcy option that would allow wage-earning debtors to repay debts.64 
This option would incentivize wage-earning debtors to file bankruptcy and 
create a plan to repay their debts, but suffer less stigma. Lessened stigma for 
these debtors would, by comparison, increase the relative stigma for non-wage-
earning or liquidation debtors. Following the Solicitor General’s 
recommendation to decrease stigma for wage-earning debtors, Congress passed 
 
 58 Representative Case Broderick of Kansas, speaking in support of voluntary bankruptcy during debate 
on the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, quoted in CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 141 (De 
Capo Press, Inc. 1972) (1935). 
 59 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Decade of the Twenties, 36 AM ECONOMIC REV. 1 (1946). 
 60 Expanding over 10% each year of the decade from 1920–1929, reaching an inflation-adjusted $7.1 
billion in 1929 alone. Moss & Johnson, supra note 12, at 315. 
 61 In 1931, Rolf Nugent noted that the rate of consumer bankruptcy had doubled every five years since 
1920 and appeared to be increasing. He predicted that by 1940 one in fifteen wage-earning families would be 
in the beginning stages or within six years of bankruptcy. Id. at 316–17 (citing Rolf Nugent, Why Wage 
Earners Go Bankrupt, AM. BANKERS ASSOC., July 1931, at 9). 
 62 Id. (citing Rolf Nugent, Why Wage Earners Go Bankrupt, AM. BANKERS ASSOC., July 1931, at 9) 
(noting the correlation between the increase in consumer bankruptcies during the last ten years and the 
increase in the use of consumer credit). 
 63 Id. (citing Thomas D. Thatcher, Administration of the Bankruptcy Act, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-THIRD 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HELD AT CHICAGO, IL, AUG. 20, 21 AND 22, 1930, at 
251, 253, 255 (1930)). 
 64 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799 (stating that repayment 
plans provide “great self-satisfaction and pride to those debtors who complete them and at the same time effect 
a maximum return to creditors”). 
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the Chandler Act in 1938.65 The Act included a wage-earner plan that 
eventually evolved into chapter 13.66 
Bankruptcy stigma received little attention through the Great Depression 
and World War II, and there were few changes to the bankruptcy provisions 
following the Chandler Act. By the early 1960s, consumer credit expanded 
again, like it had in the 1920s.67 Also like in the 1920s, an increase in 
consumer bankruptcy filings accompanied the increase in available consumer 
credit.68 Commentators suggested that what stigma remained to filing 
bankruptcy was diminishing, premised on the evidence of increased filings.69 
The Supreme Court complicated this suggestion by noting that although filing 
under the repayment chapter XIII allowed a debtor to avoid stigmatizing 
bankruptcy adjudication, stigma remained for those adjudged bankrupt.70 
Responding to the conflicting perceptions of bankruptcy’s stigma, Congress 
proposed a committee to study the existing bankruptcy laws in 1970.71 At the 
study’s conclusion in 1973, the Committee provided Congress a formal report 
that declared, “[T]he preponderant majority of debtors desire some means of 
paying their debts in preference to incurring the stigma and other consequences 
of bankruptcy.”72 In other words, stigma’s presence in bankruptcy made 
repayment a more attractive option for debtors than liquidation because of the 
distinct psychological difference between discharge in chapters 7 and 13.73 
 
 65 Moss & Johnson, supra note 12, at 319. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 328 (noting the “explosion of consumer credit and consumer bankruptcies since World War II”). 
 68 Id. at 316 (noting that this is the second credit crisis—the first of which was in the 1930s when there 
was also a discussion of the lack of stigma associated with bankruptcy). 
 69 Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 376–77 n.56 (“[W]hile one may become 
somewhat stigmatized as a result of bearing the label of a bankrupt, this stigma is becoming of diminishing 
social importance.” (quoting G. Stanley Joslin, The Philosophy of Bankruptcy—A Re-Examination, 17 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 189, 192 (1964))). 
 70 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1965) (“In [bankruptcy under the 1898 Act] 
proceedings, everyone lost—the creditors by receiving a mere fraction of their claims, the debtor by bearing 
thereafter the stigma of having been adjudged a bankrupt.”). 
 71 Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. 
 72 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.DOC. No. 93-
137, pt. 1, at 157 (1973). 
 73 Sheila Driscoll, Consumer Bankruptcy and Gender, 83 GEO. L. J. 525, 542 (1994) (“[W]omen 
operating under the ethic-of-care mentality may be more comfortable reorganizing their debts under Chapter 
13 rather than leaving their creditors out in the cold under Chapter 7.”). 
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In the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress acted to ameliorate debtor’s 
attitudes about bankruptcy and society’s attitudes about debtors.74 First, 
Congress addressed a filer’s psychological stigma, incentivizing wage-earners 
to file in the new chapter 13 repayment chapter.75 Because even partial debt 
repayment is in line with the social norms of keeping one’s promises, chapter 
13 decreased stigma. Chapter 13 allowed wage-earning debtors to pay their 
debts over time instead of discharging them immediately.76 Many debtors and 
congressional advisors saw repayment and “com[ing] to an accord with [one’s] 
creditors”77 as a preferable alternative to bankruptcy’s stigma.78 Second, 
Congress addressed social perceptions of individuals filing bankruptcy. 
Congress changed the term for filers from “bankrupt” to “debtor” throughout 
the Code.79 Because “debtor” is descriptive and neutral, it is less stigmatizing 
than “bankrupt,” which carries negative connotations.80 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, increased credit lending to poorer 
individuals created a new norm that changed social perception of debtor 
responsibility for their bankruptcy more than Code changes. In these decades, 
credit lending expanded again, but this expansion was novel because it reached 
poorer and poorer individuals.81 The necessary outcomes of such lending are 
that the number of debtors increases, the debt-income ratio increases, or some 
combination of the two.82 The actual result was a combination: consumer debt 
 
 74 See Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 377–78. 
 75 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6078–79. 
 76 In re Paulson, 170 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (“One of the major reasons, if not the major 
reason, for Congress having enacted the provisions of Chapter 13 was to provide flexible relief to wage earners 
who voluntarily sought a means of repaying their debts without incurring the stigma and other consequences of 
straight liquidation bankruptcy.”); see also Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 378. 
 77 In re Scher, 12 B.R. 258, 262 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 78 Id.  
 79 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 40–42 (1981) (statement of Jonathan Landers, Professor, University of Illinois Law 
School) (contending that the 1978 Bankruptcy Act reduced the stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy by 
changing the name of filers from “bankrupts” to “debtors.”); see also David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, 
III, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of 
Today’s United States Bankruptcy Courts and Its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 179 (2000). 
 80 Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 219–20 
(1999) (claiming that the replacement of “bankrupt” with “debtor” contributed to the loss of bankruptcy 
stigma) 
 81 Moss & Johnson, supra note 12, at 332. 
 82 Moss and Johnson provide an example assuming creditors fixed lending of ten billion. Initially ten 
billion was lent to one million households (ten thousand per household) and the household average income 
was one hundred thousand (debt-income ratio: 10%). Moving down the income distribution, the lender would 
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was concentrated in increasingly lower income households—meaning more 
households that were less able to pay back their debt.83 Although the cause of 
increased bankruptcy filings can be difficult to ascertain and multi-faceted, this 
expanded credit lending and subsequent debt would alone be sufficient to 
result in increased filings.84 For debtors that could repay some or most of their 
debt, a bankruptcy court could rule that liquidation was abuse and dismiss the 
case.85 
Several decades later, leading up to BAPCPA, filings continued to increase, 
but there were again conflicting perceptions as to whether stigma’s prevalence 
affected filers.86 Well-known financial expert Alan Greenspan, who was 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987–2006, noted that stigma was 
waning: “[P]ersonal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost 
their sense of shame.”87 In contrast, empirical evidence did not demonstrate 
stigma’s decline with as much confidence as Chairman Greenspan.88 
Nevertheless, BAPCPA implemented structural changes to the Code to 
respond to the perceived drop in bankruptcy stigma89 and to shape societal 
 
either have to increase the number of borrowers ten-fold, and lend 10% less to the lower income families, to 
maintain the same debt-income ratio, or lend to the same number of families, but now with a 100% debt-
income ratio, or they could do both, increasing simultaneously the number of debtors and the debt-income 
ratio. Id. 
 83 Id. at 333 (“[H]ouseholds with 45 percent of national income carried 42 percent of consumer debt in 
1983, whereas households with only 36 percent of national income carried 56 percent of consumer debt in 
1992.”). 
 84 Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 249, 264 (1997) (“Thus, an increase in the profitability of issuing credit cards should be expected to lead 
to an increase in actual defaults and actual bankruptcies.”). 
 85 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1984) (“After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the 
request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this 
chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial 
abuse of the provisions of this chapter.”). In In re Edwards, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York interpreted Congress’s intent: “Congress intended the courts to apply Code § 707(b) as a type of 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. It is to be used to deny Chapter 7 relief to those persons 
who . . . fail to reflect a need for the relief being sought because . . . the debtor is [not] now suffering [n]or will 
suffer in the near future from any meaningful economic hardship.” Edwards, 50 B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 86 Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 380. 
 87 Moss & Johnson, supra note 12, at 311. 
 88  Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 22, at 365, 380, 385 (citing Margaret Howard, 
Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No Good, 17 BANK. DEV. J. 425, 453 (2001) (book review)). 
 89 See generally Rafael Efrat, Attribution Theory Bias and Perception of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy, 
10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 205, 206 (2003). 
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attitudes regarding consumer discharge.90 This congressional motivation is in 
sharp contrast with the populist motivations that sought decreased bankruptcy 
stigma ahead of the Chandler Act.91 
Lawmakers’ and public perception of stigma’s effect on debtors in 
bankruptcy have both been major driving forces for bankruptcy legislation 
throughout American history. Whether lawmakers intend to reflect changing 
norms92 or drive social perceptions,93 social and moral norms connected to 
stigma remain at the forefront of statutory changes. This ever-present 
perception of stigma and the assumption that it shapes behavior is part of the 
very structural makeup of the Code. 
II. STIGMA AND AGENCY IN CHAPTER 7 FILINGS 
The Code is premised on the ideal of financial self-sufficiency94 and 
individual agency. A presumption about debtor agency pervades the Code and 
legislative responses to debtor behaviors throughout its development. 
Lawmakers depend on individual agency—the idea that actors have the 
freedom to choose between several options and that law fundamentally shapes 
the process by which actors decide on an option.95 Part II.A discusses two 
central Code features—prepetition voluntary filing and post-discharge fresh 
start—and demonstrates how they presume autonomy before and after 
bankruptcy. Part II.B discusses two BAPCPA-introduced administrative 
changes—the means test and the prepetition credit counseling requirements—
that reinforce the presumption of autonomy inherent in the structure of the 
 
 90 Press Release, White House, President Bush signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/ 
04/20050420-5.html.  
 91 See supra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
 92 See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the switch from “bankrupt” to “debtor”). 
 93 See, e.g., supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Chandler Act). 
 94 Professor Fineman noted that these ideals are exemplified in society at large, saying that American 
culture espouses a “particularized and superficial type of autonomy [that] has become the standard applied in 
judging societal institutions . . . . Economic independence and self-sufficiency are set up as transcendent 
values, attainable for all . . . members of society.” FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3, at 28. 
 95 Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 529 (1992) 
(noting that laws set up structures whose “function seeks, however obliquely, to shape people’s thoughts and 
acts in an area of life in which freedom is widely and properly prized”). But see Moss & Johnson, supra note 
12, at 331 (noting that the inexplicable rise in filings even after the pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms of 1984 
may indicate that “consumer debtors are simply not as sensitive to changes in the bankruptcy law as some 
analyses have suggested”). 
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Code and work to increase stigma for consumer debtors trying to file chapter 7 
petitions.96 
A. Two Structural Presumptions of Autonomy in the Code 
1. Prepetition Structured Autonomy: Voluntary Filing 
Voluntary filing first became part of U.S. bankruptcy law in 1841.97 As 
indicated in the brief bankruptcy history above, voluntary bankruptcy filing 
was a rallying cry for populists seeking bankruptcy protection for debtors.98 
Policymakers sought to protect the honest but unfortunate debtor,99 since they 
recognized that stigma should not apply when someone is deserving of 
bankruptcy protections.100 
Of course, the honest but unfortunate debtor was not the only type of 
debtor to use the voluntary bankruptcy filing provision. Voluntary filing, or the 
“autonomy to file,”101 is accessible to all. Thus, voluntary filing has been 
subject to criticism because dishonest and fraudulent debtors can also use it.102 
All individuals eligible to be debtors under chapter 7 are eligible under § 301 
to file a voluntary petition.103 
 
 96 Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 407, 411, 435 (2002) (arguing credit counseling and means testing make chapter 7 more cumbersome, 
expensive, and inaccessible). In addition, the legislative intention of the means test was to get tougher on 
debtors by changing language from “abuse” to “substantial abuse.” Id. 
 97 Kennedy & Clift, Historical Analysis of Insolvency, supra note 79, at 171 (stating that in addition to 
opening eligibility requirements to all classes of debtors, the 1841 Act also “introduc[ed] a novel concept—
voluntary cases”). 
 98 Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification 
for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REV. 467, 518 (1998) (“The Act of 1800, like the English law, was 
conceived in the view that the bankrupt was dishonest; while the act of 1841 and the later acts proceeded upon 
the assumption that he might be honest but unfortunate.” (quoting Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi., 
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 670 (1935))); see also discussion supra Part I.B. 
 99 WARREN, supra note 58, at 141. 
 100 In 1898, supporters of the return of voluntary filing provisions precisely argued that there are 
circumstances outside the debtor’s control and that these misfortunes should not be categorized as the debtor’s 
fault. See id. at 141–42. 
 101 Coulson, supra note 98, at 541 (“[A]utonomy to file when the debtor cannot or feels she should not 
pay”). 
 102 Those who introduced voluntary filing led its repeal only a year and half after its passage. One of these 
legislators, Senator Thomas Benton, said, “[The Act] has expunged the State insolvent laws and has met the 
universal condemnation of the country.” WARREN, supra note 58, at 84.  
 103 Section 301 applies to filing under any chapter, but this Comment discusses only chapter 7 filings. 
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Under chapter 7, an individual is eligible to become a debtor104 if the U.S. 
has jurisdiction over her.105 Because of this low bar and lack of external 
requirements for qualifying as a debtor in chapter 7 bankruptcy,106 the public 
perceives filing for bankruptcy to be within the debtor’s control or agency. 
Therefore, the debtor is susceptible to the heightened social stigma that attends 
freely-chosen, yet socially-deviant, behavior.107 
2. Postpetition Structured Autonomy: “Fresh Start” 
Fresh start is central to bankruptcy because it allows debtors the 
“opportunity to put misfortune or irresponsibility behind them and to begin life 
anew.”108 The discharge of debts is crucial to a debtor’s personal and financial 
freedom, allowing her to move beyond indebtedness.109 As the Supreme Court 
stated in 1934: 
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those 
dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty quite as 
much as if not more than it is a property right. . . . The new 
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford the emancipated debtor, 
would be of little value to the wage-earner if he were obliged to face 
the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of his 
earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of 
indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy.110 
 
 104 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)–(b) (2006). 
 105 Id. The U.S. has jurisdiction if the individual is a U.S. domicile or resident, or owns property or a 
business in the U.S., among other factors. Id. 
 106 BAPCPA imposes some non-jurisdictional-based requirements to be a debtor, including a means test 
and mandatory credit counseling. See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the effects of these requirements on 
autonomy and stigma). 
 107 Of course, involuntary creditor-initiated bankruptcy can also lead to stigma based on the debtor’s 
actions before filing, but the nature of voluntary filing makes the connection between autonomy and stigma 
much more direct. 
 108 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 116 (6th 
ed. 2009).  
 109 Moss & Johnson, supra note 12, at 329 (discussing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6078–79 “The 1977 House Report explained: ‘the premises of the bill with respect 
to consumer bankruptcy are that use of the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors 
should attempt repayment under chapter 13 . . . and finally . . . bankruptcy relief should be effective, and 
should provide the debtor with a fresh start.’”). 
 110 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). 
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Discharge allows future earnings to pay for future purchases instead of 
enslaving the debtor to a neverending cycle of paying off growing prior debts. 
A debtor’s fresh start post-bankruptcy is one of three foundational U.S. 
bankruptcy policies, along with equitable distribution to creditors and 
economical administration of the bankruptcy process.111 As these latter two 
policies do not relate directly to the debtor, the fresh start is the debtor’s 
primary motivation for filing bankruptcy to begin again after discharge, more 
or less debt-free.112 
Fresh start is statutorily and judicially reinforced by prohibiting borrowers 
from contracting around bankruptcy.113 Some scholars argue in support of the 
economic benefits of allowing sophisticated parties the freedom to waive their 
privilege to file bankruptcy when contracting.114 As other scholars have noted, 
this position has only been supported in the business bankruptcies; no one has 
suggested that individual consumers be able to contract around bankruptcy.115 
An ability to rehabilitate should not require prospective knowledge of its need. 
The importance of the fresh start comes from an American philosophy and 
attendant morality premised on the primacy of the individual and free market 
forces, not social protections or subsidy.116 As Richard Coulson noted: 
The fresh start notion has close connections with individualism and a 
market philosophy. It reflects a basic decision that the costs and 
benefits of discharge should be—and safely can be—left to the 
individual debtor. The system rests on a free market philosophy that 
 
 111 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 
542 (1999). 
 112 This excepts those debtors who may choose to reaffirm discharged debts or who may have particular 
debts that are non-dischargeable. 
 113 In re Demeter, 478 B.R. 281, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012) (citing In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 11-
199, 2012 WL 2130981, at *72 (D. Del. June 11, 2012)) (noting that the strong federal interest in providing 
debtors a fresh start overrides state interests like those under contract law). 
 114 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note 111, at 515 (indicating circumstances amongst 
sophisticated parties where there may be an ability to contract around bankruptcy, or waive the automatic 
stay); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX L. 
REV. 51, 117 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 
1807, 1850–51 (1998). 
 115 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 n.3 (2005). 
 116 See FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3, at 9 (“Autonomy is the absence of economic 
dependence on outsiders, particularly on the government.”). 
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throws the social and economic risks of credit on creditors and 
debtors, rather than on society at large.117 
Bankruptcy in the U.S. is therefore centered on the individual free market 
participant and bankruptcy exists for her fresh start. This foundation accords 
with other legal bases in the U.S., including the social contract118 and the 
concept of a contract more generally.119 Autonomy focuses on the individual 
since it is defined as “the absence of economic dependence on outsiders, 
particularly on the government.”120 Autonomy is presumed both prepetition in 
allowing for debtor agency and voluntary filing, and postpetition in the goal of 
debtor fresh start. 
B. Autonomy and the Rationale for BAPCPA 
BAPCPA reinforced the structural presumptions of autonomy in the Code, 
apparent in the legislative debates and history, and newly imposed 
requirements on debtors. The amendments were explicitly intended to increase 
debtor stigma.121 
1. Congressional Analyses of the Code’s Shortcomings: 1994–2005 
BAPCPA’s legislative history indicates a high level of congressional 
agreement about the low level of debtor stigma and the problems that the new 
amendment should address. Legislators’ statements concerning the need for 
Code revision in the period leading up to BAPCPA indicate a widespread 
perception that individuals’ lack of personal financial responsibility was the 
primary cause of consumer bankruptcy.122 Both BAPCPA supporters and 
 
 117 Coulson, supra note 98, at 540. 
 118 FINEMAN, AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that the Constitution’s “We the people” 
bases the legitimacy of governance on the consent of the governed and protects inalienable rights of the self-
governed individual subject). 
 119 Id. at 219 (“[T]he concept of contract is one of the primary devices for understanding individual and 
institutional relationships.”). This concept “imagines autonomous adults, capable and equal individuals 
engaged in a process employing wit, knowledge, and skill, rightly held to the terms they hash out in the 
process.” Id. 
 120 Id. at 9. 
 121 This includes an increased waiting period between chapter 7 filings, from six years under the Pre-
BAPCPA statute to eight years under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)(2006). 
 122 See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 6 (2001) (“[T]his legislation responds to many of the factors 
contributing to the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability, 
the proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to eliminate abuse in the system.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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opponents concurred about specific problems that should be addressed, 
including serial filings, an increase in consumer filings, decreased financial 
accountability, and the absence of effective oversight.123 This agreement about 
the need for legislation and the diagnosis of the inherent problems in the 
financial system underscores that the structure of the Code presumes debtor 
autonomy. 
Legislators on both sides of the issue agreed that the U.S. bankruptcy 
system allowed for gamesmanship and should be corrected.124 In the years 
leading up to the passage of BAPCPA, including its precursor legislation the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998,125 there was bipartisan agreement about the 
problems with US bankruptcy. Legislators on both sides noted that high 
amounts of consumer debt and high numbers of bankruptcy filings indicated a 
national problem.126 However, there was disagreement about whether a causal 
connection between high consumer debt and high bankruptcy filings existed. 
While opponents of BAPCPA noted that there was merely a correlation, not 
causation,127 supporters described causation: that the high number of filings 
was a result of consumers abusing the credit they were offered.128 
These floor statements were directly connected to stigma when repackaged 
for a media audience. Senator John Kerry noted on PBS NewsHour, “[T]here 
has been a decline, as we all know, in the stigma of filing for personal 
 
 123 Id.; A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1861, 1873–74 (2006). 
 124 150 CONG. REC. H149 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (in support: 
“[D]ebtors are obtaining credit cards despite having little or no income, incurring huge debts, paying those 
debts with worthless checks, and then filing for bankruptcy relief.”); 149 CONG. REC. H1996 (daily ed. Mar. 
19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (opposed: “A number of us were willing to sit down and roll up our 
sleeves and try to deal with the fact that people were gaming the bankruptcy system.”). 
 125 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 496 (2005) (noting that the 1998 Act “became the foundation for 
bankruptcy reform as ultimately reflected in BAPCPA”). 
 126 144 CONG. REC. H8448 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Shelia Jackson-Lee) (opposed to 
the legislation: “[A]bout 1.4 million families will file for consumer bankruptcy . . . the rise in bankruptcies 
follows equally sharp rises in the amount of consumer debt per household”); 151 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. 
Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (in support of the legislation: “In 2004 alone, there were 1.6 
million more bankruptcies than during the entire Great Depression. . . . Certainly one of the critical reasons 
behind the rising tide of filings . . . are the actions of those who flagrantly abuse our generous bankruptcy 
laws.”). 
 127 See 144 CONG. REC. H8448–49 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Shelia Jackson-Lee) 
(discussing filing statistics and research).  
 128 See 151 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
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bankruptcy, and certainly we would agree that appropriate changes are 
necessary in order to ensure that bankruptcy not be considered a lifestyle 
choice.”129 By characterizing bankruptcy as a lifestyle choice, Senator Kerry 
blamed consumers’ assumption of more debt on decreased stigma, resulting in 
higher numbers of bankruptcy filings. 
Academics also theorized about the causes behind increased consumer 
bankruptcy filings. A 1998 study indicated that economic predictors, like 
unemployment and poverty, which were expected to correlate with increased 
filings,130 did not explain the increased filings through the Reagan recovery nor 
the filings peak in conjunction with the 1991 recession.131 The study’s authors 
concluded that the most likely explanation for this filings jump was not 
economic, but rather a shift in social norms from heightened bankruptcy 
stigma to a more tolerant stance regarding debt discharge.132 
Statements about decreased stigma, abuse, and the brokenness of the 
bankruptcy system were premised on the individual consumer making an 
autonomous and rational decision to enter bankruptcy. Whether lawmakers 
noted only correlation or imputed causation between the increased 
indebtedness and increased bankruptcy filings,133 there was a unifying focus on 
the actions and motivations of the debtor, rather than the causes for her debt.134 
Prior to BAPCPA’s enactment, many lawmakers identified the decrease in 
debtor stigma as a problem.135 This focus on stigma indicates that lawmakers 
presumed individuals are, at their root, autonomous actors.136 
 
 129 PBS Newshour: Bankruptcy (PBS television broadcast Mar. 15, 2001) (transcript available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/economy/jan-june01/bankruptcy_03-15.html#). 
 130 F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 200 (1998). 
 131 See id. at 187. 
 132 Id. at 206 (“Nature does not make jumps. . . . But it may make a jump on a change in social norms, 
such as one has observed in recent years. The skeptic who thinks otherwise will have a very difficult time 
accounting for recent changes in illegitimacy rates or in consumer bankruptcy filing rates.”). 
 133 See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text. 
 134 144 CONG. REC. S10471 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Mr. President, the 
explosion in bankruptcy filings has less to do with causes and more to do with motivations. The stigma of 
bankruptcy is all but gone.”). 
 135 See Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 16, at 486 (“Bankruptcy should be difficult, and the moral 
stigma that used to be associated with bankruptcy ought to be resurrected.” (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S10635, 
S10650 (daily ed. Sept. 21,1998) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley))); 144 CONG. REC. H4333, H4367 (daily 
ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Rep. Ellen Tauscher) (“The stigma that was once attached to bankruptcy has 
disappeared.”); Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the Interests of Debtors and Creditors, CONG. DIG., Dec. 1998, 
at 289, 311 (“Today nobody cares about morality anymore. There is no moral stigma. Therefore, people go 
bankrupt.” (quoting Rep. Jerrold Nadler)); House and Senate Committees Meet to Consider Bankruptcy 
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At the press conference that accompanied BAPCPA’s signing, President 
George W. Bush also used an autonomy rationale, stating that America “is a 
nation of personal responsibility where people are expected to meet their 
obligations.”137 President Bush reinforced the presumption of abuse and fraud 
that BAPCPA was enacted to address. However, this presumption echoed by 
lawmakers’, judges’, and academics’ sweeping statements hide the fact that 
there was a dearth of evidence to support such widespread abuse.138 Public 
perception and rhetoric preceding BAPCPA did not match the evidence, which 
indicated that bankruptcy abuse was overemphasized.139 Indications like the 
increased number of filings140 and the ability of some chapter 7 debtors to pay 
a substantial amount of their debt do not mean that this was due to decreased 
stigma.141 Subsequent studies questioned these earlier studies’ assumptions and 
 
Reform, 8 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS (Apr. 8, 1999) (quoting Senator Christopher Dodd’s advocacy of 
bankruptcy reform because the social stigma of bankruptcy is gone). 
 136 However, the expansion of lending to lower income populations means that they are less likely to be 
able to pay back their debt. See Braucher, supra note 96, at 425–26 (citing Douglas Baird, Bankruptcy’s 
Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L. J. 5673 (1998)). 
 137 Press Release, White House, President Bush signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/ 
04/20050420-5.html.  
 138 The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 20 (1997) 
(prepared statement of Ian Domowitz, Professor of Economics, Northwestern University) (“Like the vast 
majority of researchers in the area of consumer bankruptcy, I fail to find any evidence of substantial Chapter 7 
abuse.”). 
 139 Diann Carol Vennink Moorman, Consumer Bankruptcy: Are Allegations of Abuse Well Founded?, 22–
25 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Iowa State University) (available on ProQuest UMI Microform 
3229108) (finding that filing bankruptcy was not the first choice for bankrupt households; on the contrary, for 
many households it was the last choice). 
 140 A study by Visa Inc. attributed the rise in filings to an increase in consumer exploitation tendencies 
and a decrease in stigma for younger populations. See VISA U.S.A. INC. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REPORTS, 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 14, 22 (1996), http://www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/ 
report/g2a.pdf. 
 141 See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY, VOL. I, CONSUMERS’ 
RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORIGINS AND EFFECTS 88–91 (1982). 
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methodology,142 especially since the earlier studies were either poorly done or 
funded by the credit industry.143 
In spite of the studies’ lack of credibility, congressional perceptions and 
rhetoric about declining bankruptcy stigma drove BAPCPA.144 Lawmakers 
connected lack of stigma to wage-earning debtors’ abuse of the bankruptcy 
system and attributed fault to voluntary filers.145 Accordingly, lawmakers 
provided several remedies to address these perceived problems: the means 
testing requirement, which limits a debtor’s ability to voluntarily file for 
chapter 7 liquidation and her ability to receive a fresh start;146 and the 
prepetition credit counseling requirement, which provides an additional hurdle 
to a debtor’s ability to voluntarily file for bankruptcy.147 
2. Means Test: Increasing Stigma for Debtors 
Section 707 codifies the means test. It presumes bankruptcy abuse for over-
median-income debtors who file for chapter 7 liquidation, unless they 
demonstrate an inability to pay 25% of their debt to general unsecured 
creditors over the course of sixty monthly payments.148 An individual filing for 
bankruptcy must complete Form 22A, which calculates the filer’s income and 
debt, and determine whether the court must presume abuse.149 Form 22A 
 
 142 See Teresa A. Sullivan et al, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors’ 
Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1145 (reviewing the Credit Research Center study, supra note 141, and noting, 
“As a scientific study it is deeply flawed. [It] lacks crucial expertise, is designed incorrectly, asks a series of 
inartful questions, gathers its data improperly, misanalyzes the statistical data and draws erroneous and biased 
inferences from the data analysis.”); see also Efrat, Attribution Theory Bias, supra note 89, at 209–13 (2003) 
(describing sources critical of these studies and their supporting evidence). 
 143 Id. at 210–11 (2003); see, e.g., CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., supra note 141, at 88–91 (1982) (sponsored 
by the Credit Research Center, which was founded at Purdue University in 1974 and is funded by credit 
industry executives); VISA, supra note 140, at 14, 22. 
 144 Sullivan et al., supra note 23, at 214 (noting that BAPCPA was justified primarily because of the 
attribution of increased filings to decreased stigma). 
 145 Dickerson, supra note 123, at 1891–92. 
 146 The success rate of chapter 13 filings, allowing discharge and therefore fresh start as the alternative to 
filing chapter 7 liquidation, depends on good administration and reasonable living expenses, which are not 
always reality. See Braucher, supra note 96, at 410. 
 147 Credit counseling is required for filings regardless of the reason for financial indebtedness. See infra 
Part II.B.3. 
 148 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006). 
 149 CHAPTER 7 STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND MEANS-TEST CALCULATION, OFFICIAL 
BANKRUPTCY FORM 22A (12/10), available at http://www.U.S.C.ourts.gov/U.S.C.ourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/BK%20Forms%201210/B_22A_1210.pdf. 
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requires non-exempt debtors who have a greater than average income for a 
similarly sized family in their state to subtract their actual debts and undertake 
the calculation required in §707 (b)(2).150 This calculation means judges must 
presume abuse for debtors above the line, while debtors below it may be 
allowed to file chapter 7.151 
The means test was heavily discussed prior to its passage in BAPCPA. In 
1994, ahead of the years-long debate over BAPCPA, Congress appointed the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission to review, improve and update the 
Code, but “not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law.”152 
In 1994, Congress did not believe that there was a problem of consumer 
bankruptcy abuse.153 When the report was released in 1997, five of the nine 
commission members affirmed this assessment and proposed only minor 
revisions.154 However, the four dissenters on this commission were vocal about 
the need for structural revisions like the means test.155 These commission 
members stated that without the means test, bankruptcy relief was “too easy to 
obtain,” and was a first instead of last resort for “people who can’t keep up 
with their bills,” and that the “moral stigma once attached to bankruptcy has 
eroded.”156 Based on these rationales and the support of the consumer credit 
 
 150 Form 22A allows exemptions for some military and non-consumer debtors. It then calculates the 
debtor’s income over the past six months to determine whether the income is greater than the median income 
for an equally sized family in the debtor’s state of domicile. If so, the form requires the presumption of abuse 
according to the formula stated in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). Id. 
 151 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (“[I]f the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts 
determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of (I) 25 percent of 
the debtor’s non-priority unsecured claims in the case, or $7025, whichever is greater; or (II) $11,725.”) Here 
is an example to see how this test operates: a three-person family living in Georgia, where the median income 
for a family of three is $55,711 ($27,855.50 over six months). The family’s income over the past six months is 
$28,000, and their allowable expenses (including housing, food, taxes, etc.) are $4,510 per month. In addition, 
they have unsecured debt (such as medical and credit card debt) of $38,000. Their income is above the state 
median for a family of three, so they must go through the means test. Their disposable income is $156.67 per 
month ($9400.20 when multiplied by the sixty month over the five years of repayment in chapter 13). This is 
less than $10,000, so the final step of the analysis is to see if this amount is also less than 25% of the debtor’s 
total unsecured debt ($9,500 in this case). Because the family’s disposable income ($9,400) is also less than 
25% of the general unsecured debt ($9,500), this family passes the means test and is able to file for chapter 7 
(liquidation).  
 152 H.R. Rep. NO. 103-835, at 59 (1994). 
 153 Dickerson, supra note 123, at 1864. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 1865. 
 156 Id. (citing Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 
(1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/24commvi08.html). 
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lobby,157 the commission’s dissenters revived the initially failed means test, 
providing the groundwork for the version that became law in BAPCPA.158 
In the subsequent debate over BAPCPA, law professors argued that it was 
detrimental159 because the means test was a solution to a non-existent 
problem.160 For instance, Professor Braucher stated, “[T]he [pre-BAPCPA] 
system already effectively screens out most of those who don’t belong in 
it . . . . Most individual debtors in bankruptcy do not have non-exempt assets 
and receive little or no income in excess of their reasonable expenses.”161 The 
additional administrative requirements to the voluntary filing provisions, like 
the means test, did not solve a real problem in the system, and even worse, 
added expense to the entire bankruptcy system, making it less accessible for 
those needing it most.162 
3. Credit Counseling Requirement: Presuming Autonomy 
BAPCPA added a new prepetition requirement for individual debtors: 
credit counseling.163 Lawmakers assumed that the debtor had autonomy over 
her financial situation to the extent that recognition of the causes of her 
financial distress would prevent its recurrence.164 The credit-counseling 
requirement states that subject to certain exemptions for extreme 
 
 157 Dickerson, supra note 123, at 1865 n. 19 (citing Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANK. L.J. 483, 496 (1997)) (describing the consumer credit industry’s 
lobbying efforts before the Commission). 
 158 Dickerson, supra note 123, at 1865–66. 
 159 Braucher, supra note 96, at 407 (2002) (noting that decreased access to bankruptcy through the means 
test is likely to lead to more indebtedness, not increased payments to creditors). 
 160 Id. at 407; see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAW LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS 
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 239–40 (1989); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New 
Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 27, 31 (1999) (finding that under 1998 version of legislation, means testing would force 3.6% of sample 
Chapter 7 debtors to pay something). 
 161 Braucher, supra note 96, at 407. 
 162 Id. at 408. 
 163 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2006). 
 164 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-203, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT 
COUNSELING REQUIREMENT IS NOT CLEAR, at 19–20 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d07203.pdf (“The act requires that [the credit counseling] session include an analysis of a client’s current 
financial condition and the factors that caused this condition and help develop a plan to respond to the client’s 
problems that would not involve incurring additional debt.”). 
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inconvenience and other mitigating factors,165 individuals must undergo credit 
counseling from an approved agency in the 180 days ahead of bankruptcy 
filing.166 
This prepetition credit-counseling requirement presumes that the debtor has 
choices to avoid her current financial difficulties, and that she would benefit 
from budget tweaking and education about options. However, the content 
required in the counseling sessions is unclear.167 According to a 2007 
Government Accountability Office Survey that examined the efficacy of this 
program, this prepetition credit counseling takes an average sixty to ninety 
minutes and consists of a discussion of “the client’s financial goals and 
potential opportunities for reducing spending and paying off debt.”168 The 
debtor then leaves credit counseling with a personalized budget and options for 
moving forward.169 The prepetition counseling requirement assumes that a 
debtor’s indebtedness to the point of insolvency is primarily a consequence of 
poor fiscal choices and financial management; it assumes that bankruptcies can 
be avoided with last minute budgeting.170 
Since the efficacy of the prepetition counseling depends on debtors having 
the type of debt that can be addressed by better financial management, the 
requirement’s exceptions should relate to those types of debt that are not 
 
 165 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(2)–(4) (exempting debtors who live in districts where the trustee determines no 
approved nonprofit budgetary credit counseling agencies provide reasonably adequate services, and waiving 
the requirement under specific exigent circumstances at the discretion of the court, including those debtors 
“impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making 
rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities”). 
 166 Id. at § 109(h)(1) (“An individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, 
during the 180-day period ending on the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an 
approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency described in section 111 (a) an individual or group 
briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for 
available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.”). 
 167 Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Prepetition Credit 
Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549, 561 
(2005) (“The problem is that BAPCPA fails explicitly to define the goals of either mandate. The statute is 
vague as to the content, indeed, the very goals, of both the pre- and post-filing requirements. As such, it is 
unclear what is intended to occur in these sessions.”). 
 168 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 164, at 20. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See Press Release, National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Study: Controversial 
Bankruptcy Law Reforms Not Working—97 Percent Unable to Repay Debts, Most Pushed to Brine by Crisis 
(Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://www.nacba.org/News/NACBANews/tabid/87/articleType/ArticleView/ 
articleId/10/REPORT-Bankruptcy-Law-Reforms-Not-Working.aspx. 
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susceptible to better budgeting. On the contrary, the exemptions only cover 
various types of debtor incapacity or inaccessibility: physical, mental and 
geographic.171 The exemptions therefore predominately address debtors who 
deviate from the norm of autonomy presumed in the Code, not directly for the 
reasons for indebtedness.172 
The Code’s failure to allow exceptions from the counseling based on the 
debt’s source is astounding in light of the studies that show most indebtedness 
stems from uncontrollable circumstances rather than poor budgeting.173 In a 
multi-part study examining the sources of consumer debt, Teresa Sullivan, 
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook discovered five major reasons for 
individual bankruptcy: (1) national economic turmoil and job loss, (2) high 
medical costs/lack of health insurance, (3) divorce, (4) maintaining 
unsupportable homeownership, and (5) high interest rates on increasingly high 
consumer debt.174 In the same year, these researchers followed up on the high 
medical debt response and collected data on consumer bankruptcies.175 The 
survey focused on medical causes for bankruptcy and demonstrated that at 
least 45.6% of individuals filing for bankruptcy in 1999 cited either medical 
reasons or substantial medical debt as the cause of their bankruptcy filing, and 
20.9% stated that no one in their household had health insurance.176 
 
 171 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (allowing exemptions for mentally and physically disabled, and those debtors 
who are on active military duty in a military combat zone); see also supra note 165. 
 172 Id. at § 109(h)(2)–(3) (there is a catchall exemption for “exigent circumstances” “satisfactory to the 
court,” but it doesn’t specifically state the nature of the debt as an acceptable waiver of the credit-counseling). 
 173 NAT’L ASSOC. OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, BANKRUPTCY REFORM’S IMPACT: WHERE ARE ALL 
THE “DEADBEATS”?, at 2, 5–6 (2006), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070511203046/http://nacba. 
com/files/main_page/022206NACBAbankruptcyreformstudy.pdf (stating that nearly 80% of consumers are 
suffering from debt that is “caused by circumstances beyond their control”). These uncontrollable 
circumstances may include, for example, loss of a job, medical expenses, death, divorce or other change in 
marital status, increased minimum payments on credit cards and predatory lending. Medical Debt is Not 
Created by Deadbeats, PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.pnhp. 
org/news/2006/february/medical_debt_is_not_.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 174 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 160, at 17–20 (reporting the first two phases of the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project, which collected data on the reasons families file for bankruptcy); THERESA A. 
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN 
DEBT (2000). 
 175 The researchers surveyed 1974 debtors in six bankruptcy districts. The data, methods, and survey used 
to collect the data can be found in Appendix 1 and 2 of Melissa B. Jacoby, et al., Rethinking the Debates Over 
Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001). 
 176 Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Medical Problems and Bankruptcy Filings, NORTON’S BANKR. L. ADVISER, 
fig. 2 (2000). 
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The medical debt problem continued to grow through the 2000s. A 2007 
American Journal of Medicine study indicated that medical bankruptcies made 
up 62.1% of bankruptcies.177 Because high credit balances or other borrowing 
may disguise medical debt and other related costs like caretaking and illness-
related loss of income, this figure could be an underestimate.178 Patients and 
their caretakers commonly resort to expensive credit because of the prevalence 
of insufficient insurance.179 For individuals facing insurmountable debt 
resulting from uncontrollable circumstances, prepetition credit counseling is an 
unnecessary and time-consuming administrative expense.180 
Because the most common causes of consumer bankruptcy are 
uncontrollable, most individuals seeking bankruptcy protection are not in a 
position to benefit from prepetition credit counseling.181 Rather, credit 
counseling agencies indicate that the type of debt that has led to a debtor’s 
precarious financial situation is most often something outside of her control 
and for which she could not have adequately planned:182 79% of debtors stated 
that their debt was caused by “circumstances beyond their control.”183 The 
cause of the debt and its controllability shapes societal perceptions and stigma. 
Society is likely to view individuals perceived to be in control of their deviant 
behavior with antipathy.184 However, when society perceives an individual is 
 
 177 Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, supra note 2, at 743. Medical 
bankruptcies are defined as medical bills are reason for the bankruptcy, medical bills are greater than $5000 or 
more than 10% of the annual family income; the family home was mortgaged to pay medical bills; the debtor 
or spouse lost at least 2 weeks of income due to illness, complete disability or care for an ill family member; 
the medical problem of self, spouse or other family member was the reason for bankruptcy. Id. at 743 tbl.2. 
 178 Id. at 745 (noting that their study only confirmed through court records that medical debt owed directly 
to hospitals and doctors, and that debtors who financed their debt through credit cards or other borrowing were 
not included). 
 179 Id. at 743. 
 180 Id. at 745 (“The number of under-insured increased from 15.6 million in 2003 to 25.2 million in 2007. 
Of low- and middle-income households with credit card balances, 29% use credit card borrowing to pay off 
medical expenses over time.”). 
 181 See supra text accompanying note 174. All of these causes are uncontrollable, perhaps except 
maintenance of unsupportable homeownership. 
 182 Even if the debt was foreseeable and the debtor exercised poor financial management, a debtor ready 
to file for bankruptcy is likely beyond the point where budgeting would be helpful and needs powerful 
bankruptcy protections like the automatic stay. See supra Part IV.B. 
 183 Jeffrey D. Eaton, Note, Locked Out: The Unwary Debtor and BAPCPA’s Pre-File Credit Counseling 
Requirement, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 261, 266 (2010) (citing NAT’L ASSOC. OF CONSUMER BANKR. 
ATTORNEYS, supra note 173, at 2, 5–6 (2006)). 
 184 KATZ, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
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disadvantaged and unable to control the stigmatized behavior, society is more 
likely to show a greater degree of compassion.185 
Stigma is greatest when society perceives that the target’s freely chosen 
deviant behavior merits it. Control over circumstances and behavior is strongly 
presumed throughout bankruptcy law. BAPCPA solidified these presumptions 
of autonomy, as it created new provisions explicitly intended to stigmatize 
debtors. However, there is clearly a gap between the perception and reality of 
autonomy, highlighting the need for alternatives that better address the realities 
for chapter 7 debtors. 
III.  AUTONOMY AND VULNERABILITY 
This Part suggests an alternative conception of the individual as 
fundamentally vulnerable, not autonomous.186 Recent scholarship questions the 
presumption of radical individualism, rationality, and autonomy inherent in 
legal structures and replaces it with a presumption of vulnerability. A 
vulnerability presumption provides a fruitful framework upon which to ground 
bankruptcy, especially in relation to stigma. 
A vulnerability paradigm questions the radical autonomy of individuals in 
relation to societal and economic institutions like bankruptcy.187 Presumptions 
about norms subconsciously shape even rational human decisions to undercut 
the foundational presumption of autonomy.188 This Part responds to the flawed 
presumption of autonomy by expounding an alternative legal framework based 
on vulnerability. Because behavioral stigma is based on autonomous action, 
the efficacy of bankruptcy stigma diminishes when debtor autonomy is called 
into question. 
 
 185 Id. 
 186 Vulnerability is defined as “[A] universal aspect of the human condition, arising from our embodiment 
and our location within society and its institutions. On the individual level, vulnerability refers to the ever-
present possibility of harm, injury or biological impairment or limitation . . . [V]ulnerability also is generative 
and presents opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity and fulfillment.” Vulnerability and the Human 
Condition Initiative, Definitions, EMORY UNIV. LAW, http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/about/definitions. 
html (last visited Oct. 7 2012). 
 187 Id. (noting at the same time that human-made institutions like bankruptcy “also are vulnerable to 
capture, cooptation and corruption”).  
 188 Schneider, supra note 95, at 98–99. 
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A. Questioning Autonomy 
To analyze autonomy in bankruptcy, we must first examine what true 
financial autonomy would look like. A financially free individual is one who 
can “plan for future spending decisions, or can make reasonable predictions 
about their future ability to spend money or make purchases.”189 This 
definition indicates the financially free individual is able to plan and predict 
and economically capable to spend or save. While external factors always 
operate to affect decisions, when they prohibit individuals from being able to 
control their spending decisions, they are not financially free.190 
Financial institutions and individuals have differing abilities to conform to 
the “rational actor” paradigm, since rational decision-making presumes perfect 
information.191 Institutions, with greater access to knowledge of legal 
provisions and resources, are more likely to be able to make rational decisions 
than individuals, many of whom face knowledge, resource and willpower 
constraints on their behavior and choices.192 Individual debtors, to a greater 
extent than corporate debtors, face clear constraints on resources, and often 
cannot sufficiently plan for major debts like medical costs.193 In addition to 
resource constraints, individuals face disparities in knowledge and in 
willpower that impair their ability to behave as a “rational actor.”194 
Part of the individual’s inability to behave in an economically rational 
manner has to do with the “channeling functions” of social institutions. 
Professor Schneider, in his 1992 article, The Channeling Function in Family 
Law, explored the effect of this phenomenon on family law.195 Social and 
economic institutions operate on an unconscious level such that “their very 
 
 189 Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (2010). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Braucher, supra note 96, at 426 (citing Cass Sunstein et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, 14–16 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000)); Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (questioning rational choice theory and providing a more nuanced 
view of human behavior as relates to economic decision-making). 
 192 See generally Koroblein & Ulen, supra note 191 (exploring the limits of rational choice theory in legal 
analysis, especially those circumstances and contexts that prompt individuals to deviate from the rational 
impulses of self-interest and maximizing utility). 
 193 Eaton, supra note 183, at 267 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, supra note 
171, at 5–6). 
 194 Sunstein et al., supra note 191, at 15. 
 195 Schneider, supra note 95, at 498. 
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presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental support they 
receive . . . combine to make it seem reasonable and even natural for people to 
use them.”196 Professor Schneider noted that the channeling function is in itself 
neutral, but can be bent to serve various purposes.197 This principle is also 
relevant to other institutions that shape individual behavior, like bankruptcy.198 
Under this lens, the functions BAPCPA was designed to achieve were to 
increase debtor stigma199 and simultaneously provide consumption 
insurance.200 These two purposes work on an unconscious level to shape the 
behavior of individuals inside and outside bankruptcy. 
Two types of constraints upon an individual’s financial freedom 
problematize systemically-presumed agency and show that individuals are not 
fundamentally autonomous: internal and external. Individual debtors are 
internally constrained because their resources, knowledge, and willpower are 
limited by the realities of human embodiment. Social and economic institutions 
provide external constraints that operate on an unconscious level to channel 
behaviors into socially normative expressions. This critique of the basically 
rational actor indicates a need for an alternative conception of social and 
economic decision-making that is based on vulnerability. 
B. The Vulnerability Paradigm 
Vulnerability goes beyond recognizing the problem of parties’ disparate 
contracting capability in an otherwise objective and fundamentally just 
market.201 It questions the very reality of radically independent and 
autonomous actors in a moral, social, and economic sense.202 Vulnerability is 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 500. 
 198 Id. at 499 (connecting behavior and norming aspects of institutions through business and social 
examples: “Any institution will have both normative and behavioral aspects, and behavior within institutions 
will rarely live up to the institution’s normative aspirations.”). 
 199 Dickerson, supra note 123, at, 1891–92 (noting that the legislative history for BAPCPA was replete 
with discussion of debtor morality and the lack of debtor shame, and stating that the bankruptcy process should 
be a difficult, stigmatizing one). 
 200 See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 189–91 (2007). 
(noting that U.S. bankruptcy law provides a sort of consumption insurance that must be more robust than in 
countries that provide a generous social safety net). 
 201 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 41–42 (1999) (listing ten functional capabilities 
that democracies should protect, and make accessible to all individuals, irrespective or age and disability). 
 202 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 
8; Barry Hoffmaster, What Does Vulnerability Mean?, HASTINGS CTR. RPT., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 38, 44 (noting 
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“a conditio humana which affects us all,”203 or, alternatively, a “universal, 
inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition.”204 Because it is a 
fundamental condition of being human, arising out of embodiment,205 
vulnerability is not episodic, pertaining to particular periods of existence like 
childhood or old age, nor is it temporary or remediable, like some illnesses or 
disabilities.206 Vulnerability means that for humans, dependency is always a 
possibility.207 Vulnerabilities extend to individual social and economic 
relationships and can be shaped by social institutions that “mediate, 
compensate, and lessen our vulnerability through programs, institutions and 
structures.”208 
Professor Martha Fineman has examined the meaning of a change of 
presumption from the liberal legal subject, who is an independent, autonomous 
and self-sufficient actor, to a vulnerable legal subject in the context of the 
American statutory framework, especially in regard to equality and 
discrimination.209 The vulnerable subject speaks directly to the liberal 
presumption of autonomy discussed as a foundation of bankruptcy law. 
Assuming a core vulnerability of legal actors210 problematizes an 
individual’s agency and rejects that dependency can be entirely avoided.211 
Vulnerability and the actualization of dependency are especially relevant when 
 
that vulnerabilities are of singular importance, so morality is deficient when linked exclusively to rationality, 
and moral agency is deficient when linked with rational agency). 
 203 Michael H. Kottow, Vulnerability: What Kind of Principle Is It?, 7 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL., 281, 
282 (2004). 
 204 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 8. 
 205 Id. at 9. 
 206 Michael Kottow calls these episodic and temporary periods “susceptibility,” while maintaining a 
fundamental sense of human vulnerability. Kottow, supra note 203, at 283 (“If vulnerability is a substantial 
feature of being human, it can hardly be the appropriate description of accidental anomalies like a physical 
defect, disease or some sort of deprivation . . . Injury displaces those affected from the realm of vulnerability 
and into being vulnerated.”). Fineman terms these the episodic periods of dependency. Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 9. 
 207 Id. at 9. (noting that embodiment “carries with it the ever-constant possibility of dependency as a result 
of disease, epidemics, resistant viruses, or other biologically-based catastrophes”). 
 208 Id. at 10. It is important to note, however, that whatever their remedial function, social institutions are 
incapable of completely eradicating vulnerability, as it is fundamental to humanity. Id.  
 209 See id at 8. 
 210 Fineman notes that vulnerability extends to organizations, corporations, and states as well as 
individuals. Id. at 12. 
 211 Though access to resources and institutions that provide resilience may certainly ameliorate episodes 
of dependency. 
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examining the bankruptcy system, which is premised on individual autonomy 
through provisions like “fresh start.” When the legal system privileges this 
autonomous and independent subject, it perceives vulnerability as episodic and 
deviant from social norms (and fundamental presumptions) of autonomy, 
individualism, and liberal independence. In this model, vulnerability is 
something to fear; vulnerability is dealt with mainly by suppression, 
disengagement and denial.212 “Individualism seeks and requires self-
sufficiency and insulation from the risks that vulnerability poses. Respect for 
autonomy is, in large measure, a moral proxy for that individualistic ideal.”213 
Because vulnerability is a universal and enduring aspect of the human 
experience, it provides a stronger basis for regulatory structures like 
bankruptcy than the accidental and fleeting autonomous and independent 
liberal subject. Vulnerability theory is particularly useful for analyzing stigma 
and behavior perceived as deserving stigma, because of the terms’ close 
linguistic correlation. While vulnerability has been used as a synonym for 
stigma,214 recognition of universal vulnerability can minimize the effect of 
stigma on particular populations.215 For instance, in disability law, recognition 
of universal vulnerability would suggest universal access to “a set of 
protections of benefit to all individuals.”216 Universal access may also “change 
negative social attitudes about funding and receiving state support, as such 
support would be premised on the recognition of universal vulnerability to 
disability and illness.”217 
C. Vulnerability and the Code 
The structural assumptions of autonomy seen throughout the Code hold up 
individualism and invulnerability as an ideal. By assuming individualism, 
 
 212 See Hoffmaster, supra note 202, at 42. 
 213 Id.  
 214 See Kerry Boyne, Note, UN Women: Jumping the Hurdles to Overcoming Gender Inequality, or 
Falling Short of Expectations?, 17 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 683, 692 (2011) (citing J.M. Spectar, The Hydra 
Hath but One Head: The Socio-Cultural Dimensions of the AIDS Epidemic & Women’s Right to Health, 21 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 27 (2001)) (reading together stigma and vulnerability: “[P]olitical leaders fail to 
openly discuss the pandemic and break ‘the stigma, shame, and vulnerability suffered by women and girls 
around the world . . . . ”’). 
 215 Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483, 2524 (2011) (quoting Ani 
B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 530–31 
(2008)). 
 216 Satz, supra note 10, at 314. 
 217 Id. at 315.  
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autonomy, and agency as ideals, the Code and its creators stigmatize those 
debtors who fail to live up to self-sufficient ideals that favor wage-earners. The 
Code’s function as remedial of the failure to be financially self-sufficient 
seems contrary to the assumed interdependence of vulnerability theory, though 
it also recognizes inherent vulnerability by providing for entrepreneurial risk-
taking, allowing liquidation and promoting a debtor’s fresh start.218 At its best, 
bankruptcy is a protective safety net providing resilience and relief for 
vulnerable individuals in financial distress. 
Unfortunately, the Code is foundationally based on the myth of the 
autonomous debtor, requiring remedial support to reclaim self-sufficiency 
during moments of dependency.219 This myth is the polar opposite of the 
assumption that vulnerability is universal.220 Universal vulnerability requires 
various types of assets to compensate and ameliorate vulnerability.221 
Combined, these physical, social and human assets create resilience for 
inherent vulnerability.222 Individuals have differing abilities when it comes to 
accessing these resiliency-producing assets, and thus, differing abilities to 
shield themselves from many of the most debilitating consequences of 
dependency.223 Recognizing core vulnerability encourages an analysis of the 
Code’s structure that calls into question its inherent presumptions of autonomy, 
individuality and self-sufficiency. 
Vulnerability theory provides a better framework for understanding 
bankruptcy than do assumptions of autonomy. In line with vulnerability theory, 
the primary causes for debtors’ chapter 7 filings are connected to human 
 
 218 Coulson, supra note 98, at 541. 
 219 As Fineman noted, “[A]utonomy is . . . ascendant . . . [T]here is little or no room for an affirmative 
reconciliation of this understanding of individual autonomy with concepts such as dependence or 
vulnerability.” Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and The Responsive State, supra note 10, at 259. She 
hypothesized that this standard leads to stigmatization of dependency as a failure of the ascendant ideal of 
autonomy. Id.  
 220 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 8 
(noting that vulnerability has potential to describe “a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human 
condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility”). 
 221 Id. at 13–15 (defining three categories of assets: physical—including monetary and property goods, 
human—including individual capability, and social—including familial and cultural groups). 
 222 Id.  
 223 This move is the foundational paradigm shift offered by vulnerability analysis and will be unpacked 
throughout this Part. 
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embodiment:224 major medical emergency, interdependence and social 
relationships, divorce, economic fragility, and job loss.225 These common 
triggers for consumer liquidation petitions underscore the multiplicity of 
factors at play in a debtor’s decision to file bankruptcy. However, none of 
these major factors include intentional debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system. 
Having the legal capacity to enter into contracts and file for bankruptcy does 
not shelter the debtor from vulnerability or endow her with absolute 
autonomy.226 Calling into question the conditions of autonomy and the 
controllability of financial situations requires a rethinking of bankruptcy 
stigma as it relates to the debtor.227 Legal capacity does not necessarily mean 
that an individual is in a position to make a choice that would result in fair 
financial transactions.228 Furthermore, making complex financial decisions 
under conditions of financial pressure229 weakens the idea of the autonomous 
subject. As discussed above, the Code’s position as the gatekeeper to the 
benefits of fresh start and discharge has been manipulated to increase the 
dependency of debtors by increasing stigma.230 The Code is also in a position 
to help debtors become resilient because it is an asset-conferring entity.231 Part 
IV explores three ways in which the Code can shift from focusing on 
stigmatizing a vulnerable individual to providing the institutional means for 
debtor resilience in response to circumstances beyond the debtor’s control. 
 
 224 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 9 
(“Vulnerability initially should be understood as arising from our embodiment”). 
 225 See In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 494 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating the most common triggers for 
consumer chapter 7 liquidation), rev’d sub nom. In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 2010); Jean M. Lown, 
& Barbara R. Rowe, A Profile of Utah Consumer Bankruptcy Petitioners, 5 J. L. FAM. STUD. 113, 116–17 
(2003) (citing SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 160; SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 174); supra text accompanying note 174. 
 226 O’MAHONEY, supra note 10, at 187 (noting the corresponding responsibility of the other contracting 
party).  
 227 Braucher, supra note 96, at 428 (“[W]ith creditors encouraged to lend more under the proposed 
legislation, we would likely end up with more consumer debt and more consumer over-indebtedness, a 
phenomenon that is broader than bankruptcy.”). 
 228 O’MAHONEY, supra note 10, at 184 (determining an individual’s capacity implies autonomy but 
ignores that the general population is unable to have the level of capacity needed for high-risk financial 
transactions). 
 229 Id. at 173.  
 230 See supra Part II. 
 231 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 15 
(“As asset-conferring entities, these institutions distribute significant societal goods and should be more 
specifically regulated; normatively, this state involvement requires that the state be vigilant in ensuring that the 
distribution of such assets is equitable and fair.”). 
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IV.  DECREASING STIGMA AND PROMOTING RESILIENCE IN THE CODE 
“[U]niversal, inevitable, [and] enduring:”232 the recognition of vulnerability 
as such is a call for responsive institutions that will provide resilience for 
individual vulnerability, while remaining cognizant that these institutions 
themselves are also susceptible to vulnerability.233 Shifting the Code’s goals to 
provide resilience requires decreasing stigma and the perception thereof to 
those it is intended to help. Doing so requires an alternative structure to reflect 
the root causes of indebtedness. Congress should identify areas that most often 
cause indebtedness for vulnerable individuals and create structures that better 
support resilience in these areas and in so doing will decrease the need for such 
a high volume of bankruptcy filings. 
A. Reinstating a Pre-BAPCPA Approach to Debtor Stigma 
To incorporate an understanding of universal vulnerability and to 
counteract the myth of radical autonomy,234 the next revisions to the Code 
must begin by rolling back the BAPCPA requirements that stigmatize and 
presume debtor abuse.235 Removing the means test’s bright line presumption of 
abuse allows for greater flexibility for debtors, most of whom were not abusing 
the system, and puts the burden for proving abuse back onto creditors. 
Removing the credit counseling requirement would also help a majority of 
debtors, those who are not responsible for the circumstances that led to their 
bankruptcy. Because examining the cause of indebtedness does little to assist 
individuals who were surprised by uncontrollable events, the credit counseling 
requirement is of little use in changing debtor behavior and decreasing the 
number of bankruptcy filings. Though there are other stigmatizing provisions 
in the Code that create administrative barriers to debtor relief,236 these two 
provisions most strongly implicate ineffective stigma and should be removed. 
 
 232 Id. at 8.  
 233 Id. at 12.  
 234 See supra note 8–10 and accompanying text. Radical or root autonomy should be distinguished from 
relational autonomy. Relational autonomy carries with it “social and reciprocal duties to others” and 
“responsibilities that extend beyond satisfying one’s own individual and familial needs.” Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 10, at 261. 
 235 See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 236 For instance, the time required between chapter 7 filings increased from six to eight years in BAPCPA. 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2006) (stating that a debtor may not be granted a discharge if a chapter 7 case was filed 
in the past eight years, but nonetheless keeping intact the requirement that at least 70% of the unsecured debt 
was repaid in six years). 
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The Code needs to allow for flexibility to take into account the source of 
individual debt and the constraints attendant on individual decision-making, 
especially because constrained decision-making is the reality for most 
individuals filing bankruptcy. 
Removing the intentionally stigma-inducing provisions in the Code is a 
small but crucial start to creating a Code that creates resiliency. Negotiating the 
fine line between protectionism and paternalism will remain a concern for all 
proposals concerning stigma in bankruptcy, especially considering that 
paternalism may perpetuate and reinforce stigma for debtors.237 Even while 
maintaining the overall structure of the Code, Congress could address needless 
stigma by considering changes in areas that assume radical autonomy. By 
allowing greater judicial discretion in these areas, the Code would emphasize 
relational autonomy and the interconnectedness of individuals.238 By paying 
attention to the particular needs of debtors in the midst of bankruptcy filing, 
the process would not presume abuse by mere income-to-debt ratio; treating 
cases on their individual merits will create a more personalized system that 
would be less stigmatizing.239 
B. Structuring the Code Around Causes of Indebtedness 
Merely rolling back the stigma-promoting policies of BAPCPA will not 
fully address bankruptcy stigma because fundamental presumption of 
autonomy has always been present in bankruptcy law. It would also not 
address the positive function of stigma in those instances where debtors do 
abuse the system—such abuse could be dissuaded through social blame. As 
discussed above, individuals are often in the position of needing bankruptcy 
relief following circumstances they could not control nor adequately plan to 
address.240 The Code does not distinguish between debtors who are in 
unavoidable financial situations and debtors who arguably could control their 
 
 237 See generally GEOFFREY NELSON ET AL., SHIFTING THE PARADIGM IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH: 
TOWARDS EMPOWERMENT AND COMMUNITY (2001) (linking segregation, paternalism, passivity, dependency, 
low expectations, stagnation, stigma, and hopelessness).  
 238 See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY AND THE 
SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); Martha A. Fineman, Cracking the 
Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 
(2000). 
 239 O’MAHONEY, supra note 10, at 178–84 (explaining situationally-based factors that make abuse more 
likely in elderly and therefore require attention to the particular circumstances of vulnerable individual). 
 240 See supra Part II.B.3.  
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indebtedness and may be abusing the system. Because both types of debtors 
encounter stigma merely for filing chapter 7, stigma is not properly calibrated 
to deter socially unacceptable bankruptcy abuse while protecting the debtors 
who are not abusing the system. 
The motivations and vulnerabilities of debtors who face financial difficulty 
triggered by events outside their control241 are fundamentally different than 
debtors who can better control their over-indebtedness. The needs of the two 
types of individual debtors would be best served by filing under separate 
chapters of the Code. In the current Code, the stigma-inducing policies of 
chapter 7 apply to all debtors, even if they are only effective at channeling the 
behavior of those actually abusing the system. The means test presumes abuse 
if income and debt thresholds are met, and credit counseling requirements 
suggest that better budgeting would obviate the need for bankruptcy. These 
policies seek to address abuse and may be effective by stigmatizing debtors 
who are actually abusing the bankruptcy system. However, these same policies 
impose unproductive and vulnerability-exacerbating stigma on debtors who are 
seeking relief from uncontrollable debts. 
Alternative to removing the BAPCPA provisions, Congress could create a 
chapter that is only available to individuals whose debts are primarily the 
product of uncontrollable circumstances.242 This chapter would identify kinds 
of uncontrollable debt,243 like medical debt that would make a debtor eligible 
under this chapter, and would have different requirements for discharge than 
chapter 7. Because the source of debt was not a result of debtor 
 
 241 Events outside the debtor’s control can be foreseeable as well as unforeseeable. For individuals 
without access to structures that mitigate vulnerability and provide resilience, even foreseeable events like 
illness can be outside their control. One concrete example is the availability and cost of health insurance for all 
Americans. Individuals unable to pay for insurance, perhaps because of the high cost when not purchased 
through an employer (and sometimes even when purchased through an employer), will face additional costs 
for the foreseeable event of sickness. Therefore, determining the triggering event of bankruptcy may require 
stepping back, past just the current expense—for instance medical bills—to determine the individual’s access 
to structures that provide resilience. 
 242 As indicated in the previous footnote, debt can be uncontrollable even if the circumstances that bring it 
about are foreseeable. Foreseeable circumstances (like illness, job loss etc.) are bound to affect the least 
resilient individuals most severely. When there is a lack of proactive social supports (to assist pre-bankruptcy 
and provide resilience), there should be greater reactive support in remedial structures like the Code, not 
greater stigma. 
 243 Because foreseeable debts can lead to uncontrollable financial situations, this would also require the 
availability of access to physical and structural institutions that can provide resilience. The determination of 
whether the debt was uncontrollable may therefore appear similar to the means test, though its purpose would 
be to channel debtors into a low stigma chapter if their debts were determined to be primarily uncontrollable. 
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mismanagement or abuse, or was not within the debtor’s control, there would 
be no need for credit counseling and likely no need for passing a means test 
threshold. This chapter should be procedurally straightforward, allowing 
debtors to file without assistance of counsel and should discharge debts very 
quickly.244 Similar to chapter 7, creditors or the trustee would be able to move 
to have the case reconsidered under a different chapter or dismissed. 
This structural change has precedent in two previous bankruptcy revisions: 
the 1938 Chandler Act’s repayment chapter designed to mitigate the stigma of 
liquidation245 and 1986’s repayment chapter for family farmers.246 The 1938 
Act created a repayment chapter that allowed debtors with income to repay 
debt in order to avoid the stigma of liquidation. Instead of distinguishing 
primarily based on outcome for debtors—repayment versus liquidation before 
discharge—this proposal would focus on the cause of debt. 
Similarly, chapter 12 provides precedent for the proposed change because it 
distinguishes debtors based on their status as family farmers and the source of 
their debt.247 This chapter was incorporated into the Code in 1986 to address 
the unique problem of debt reorganization of family farmers, not sufficiently 
addressed through the chapter 13 reorganization for individuals with 
income.248 The eligibility for chapter 12 is based on the debtor’s identity as a 
family farmer or family fisherman,249 a debt limit,250 and the source of the 
debt.251 While chapter 13 provided a model for the chapter 12 provisions, the 
two chapters are not identical; chapter 12 addresses the unique situation of an 
individual whose debt and income meet specific requirements, whereas chapter 
13 has no such requirements.252 The Code does not provide adequate relief for 
 
 244 For suggested revisions to the Code, see Ronald Mann, Op-Ed., A New Chapter for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A27. 
 245 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 246 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL ¶ 1200.01 (3d ed., rev. 2012) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 958, at 45 
(1986) (Conf. Rep.)) (“Congress believed that such emergency legislation was necessary because the existing 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were not effective in providing debt relief to family farmers”). 
 247 11 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 248 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.  
 249 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(a) ([T]o qualify as a family farmer, the debtor must be an “individual or 
individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation”). 
 250 Id. ([T]he debt limit in the most recent Code is “$3,237,000 and not less than 50 percent of aggregate 
noncontingent, liquidated debts. . . .”). 
 251 Id. (The debt must “arise out of a farming operation owned or operated by such individual.”). 
 252 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL, supra note 246, ¶ 1200.01.  
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individuals who experience uncontrollable costly circumstances because its 
policies create stigma irrespective of their efficacy to modify debtor behavior. 
By distinguishing between debtors based on the source of their 
indebtedness, the Code would begin to address vulnerability by recognizing 
that the primary events triggering bankruptcy for many consumer debtors are 
uncontrollable. It would also provide flexibility for these debtors instead of 
more onerous and expensive procedures.253 For instance, because there is little 
need for credit counseling when the source of the debt was uncontrollable—
like medical debt—this requirement could be removed in the uncontrollable 
bankruptcy chapter. On the other hand, this provision may be quite helpful for 
those debtors who are more directly culpable for their financial distress, and 
requiring it for these debtors may provide the needed remedy of greater 
financial education and sophistication.254 
C. Creating Structures Supporting Resiliency in Areas Particularly Prone to 
Vulnerability and Indebtedness 
Reconceiving vulnerability as the basic paradigm of our legal system 
requires a fundamental shift in the structures that provide resilience for 
inherent vulnerabilities. One purpose of vulnerability theory is to “imagine 
responsive structures whereby state involvement actually empowers a 
vulnerable subject.”255 Law functions both retrospectively and prospectively by 
providing remedies and channeling, respectively.256 State-shaped institutions 
like bankruptcy can function in both these capacities. Creating chapters of the 
Code based on the primary cause of individual indebtedness remedies current 
gaps in an individual’s access to resilience. The proposed new chapter would 
allow the Code to properly calibrate stigma and identify the other state-shaped 
institutions that exacerbate universal vulnerability. Undertaking prospective 
analysis to better assist in addressing vulnerability and providing resilience is 
 
 253 Fineman, supra note 10, at 268 (using vulnerability as an organizing principle for policy decisions can 
help to alleviate social and economic, institutionally-based harms and the perpetuation of vulnerability); see 
also Mann, supra note 244, at A27 (suggesting that the current system is too complicated and debt relief 
should be easier to come by for people that need it most). 
 254 See supra Part II.B.3.; see also Michelle Singletary, What Deadbeats?, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at 
F01. 
 255 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 19. 
 256 Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. ECON. REV. 227, 227 (2002) 
(“It is evident that both law and morality serve to channel our behavior. Law accomplishes this primarily 
through the threat of sanctions if we disobey legal rules”).  
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more difficult because it requires a clear view of “structures and arrangements 
that . . . invisibly produce or exacerbate existing inequality.”257 
Structures that support resilience ahead of the crisis point of bankruptcy are 
necessarily external to the Code, though they would have a significant impact 
on outcomes in bankruptcy.258 Reconceiving bankruptcy alone is insufficient 
for addressing the vulnerability that leads to bankruptcy. As noted in the 
introduction, many Americans find themselves in financial trouble due to 
costly healthcare.259 Debtors facing insurmountable health care costs would be 
eligible for the new “uncontrollable circumstance” chapter because it would 
include medical debt, and this will alleviate the perceived and Code-imposed 
stigma upon these debtors. This immediate relief from the stigma of 
bankruptcy would not address the broader problem of deficient medical 
insurance,260 which will continue to bring individuals to bankruptcy unless 
proactive structures are in place to address the problem. One such structure 
could be a system that provides sufficient and universal health care coverage 
for unexpected and uncontrollable events like medical emergencies. Also, 
because medical debts are not limited to the costs of procedures, we should 
have structures in place to support caretaking for those suffering from medical 
strain. 
There are other areas where uncontrollable circumstances lead debtors to 
require the support of bankruptcy, such as job loss, unfair credit lending 
practices, and lack of affordable housing or food, or the death of the 
household’s primary earner. As there are more “uncontrollable chapter” filings, 
academics could use data from these to conduct studies that will inform 
Congress about new or revised structures to benefit those most vulnerable 
 
 257 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, supra note 10, at 21. 
 258 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to provide an exhaustive catalogue of missing or deficient 
structures that exacerbate vulnerability in the context of bankruptcy. This project will take a great deal more 
analysis. I will mention briefly one area of particular current interest, mentioned in the introduction: medical 
debt. 
 259 Supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 260 Robin A. Cohen & Michael E. Martinez, Health Insurance Coverage: Early Release of Health 
Insurance Estimates Based on Data from the 2012 National Health Interview Survey, January–March 2012, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.inflpro.com/nchs/ 
data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201209.pdf. Highlighting that in the first 3 months of 2012, over forty-seven 
million individuals in the US were uninsured when interviewed, and nearly sixty million were uninsured at 
some time in the year prior to being interviewed. In the first three months of 2012, nearly 30% of people under 
sixty-five who had private health insurance were enrolled in a high deductible plan. Id. 
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individuals. By providing resilience through restructuring of those institutions, 
we may prospectively decrease the need for bankruptcy filings. 
CONCLUSION 
BAPCPA’s abuse prevention goals as highlighted by its name—the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act—solidified and 
increased bankruptcy stigma. Because stigma is systematic within the Code, 
structural Code changes are needed to de-stigmatize those debtors toward 
whom stigma is ineffective and unwarranted. Additionally, the Code should be 
the site of structural debtor protections because fresh start is a foundational 
value within American bankruptcy policy. 
As studies in the wake of BAPCPA attest, the circumstances that 
necessitate most voluntary consumer bankruptcy filings do not suggest abuse, 
but rather a fundamental vulnerability to circumstances outside the debtor’s 
control. Imposition of stigma in these cases is counterproductive because it 
does not prompt debtors to undertake behaviors like financial responsibility 
that are more in line with social norms. Instead, it provides social punishment 
to the (typically) honest and unfortunate debtor. Because of pervasive stigma, 
the fresh start promise of bankruptcy is really only a fresh start in name, 
providing little social or financial fresh start.261 
The vulnerability paradigm’s assumption of “universal, inevitable, [and] 
enduring” vulnerability262 provides a promise for debtors entering the U.S. 
bankruptcy system. The Code needs structural changes to roll back the most 
debtor-stigmatizing provisions of BAPCPA. Bankruptcy judges should not be 
forced to presume abuse because of an arbitrary means to debt ration, but 
instead should have the ability to consider cases individually, examining the 
circumstances of a debtor’s indebtedness. Arbitrary lines can put those debtors 
 
 261 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY 
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 63 (2011), available at 
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just missing the cutoff into an unnecessarily vulnerable position of being 
unable to file a chapter 7 claim and simultaneously unable to discharge debt in 
chapter 13.263 In addition, credit counseling should be based on the 
circumstances of a debtor’s debt instead of being based merely on the 
bankruptcy filing.264 Financial advice is most effective when timely and when 
the circumstances are within the advisee’s ability to control. While judicial 
discretion can mean imperfect application of laws and additional time per case, 
the reduction in administrative costs of these additional steps can lead to much 
needed discharge for debtors who may be deterred from the sometimes high 
cost of bankruptcy. 
Resilience to one’s inherent vulnerability comes through present assets 
accumulated over time and through the processes and legal structures that 
respond to periods of dependency. When structures are set in place to promptly 
provide assets and address dependency, the need for reactive stigmatizing 
structures like bankruptcy will diminish. These proactive structures must be in 
place to address the most common sources of debt and dependency to help 
vulnerable subjects. With an amended Code and other structures in place to 
support resilience for vulnerability, the number of filings could drop, and the  
need for stigma on debtors will be appropriately minimized. With this 
accomplished, debtors would receive a fresh start in more than name alone. 
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 263 Eighty-five percent of chapter 13 cases closed in 2010 were dismissed, and nearly half of these were 
because of failure to make payments, a likely situation for those forced into chapter 13 by dint of the means 
test. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 261, at 16. 
 264 Counseling on budgeting is likely ineffective since at the point of filing bankruptcy, bankruptcy is 
typically the best course of action typically is bankruptcy. See supra notes 181–85. Or, there was little the 
debtor could have done even at an earlier stage depending on the circumstances of the debt. See supra notes 
170–72 and accompanying text. 
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